Introduction
There is a well-established literature on the economic returns to education, since Schultz (1961) and Mincer (1974) . According to human capital theory, following Becker (1962) , education is an investment that produces knowledge acquisition and increases productivity, which in turn leads to higher income. Human capital theory bears a strong resemblance to vintage capital theory. The individual's capital stock (his or her level of education) can be treated as a factor of production in its own right and may gradually depreciate with time (Byron and Manaloto 1990) . Thus, the distribution of labour incomes can be regarded as a function of education and experience, as in the benchmark Mincerian model which involves regression of the natural logarithm of earnings against educational attainment and working experience.
A large amount of empirical research, based on the Mincerian model, has been carried out for many countries and time periods and confirms that better-educated individuals earn higher wages, experience less unemployment, and work in more prestigious occupations than their less-educated counterparts (Card 1999, O'Mahony and Stevens 2009 ). Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) finds that the education returns for one additional year are 9.7% for world average, 9.9% for Asian average as well as the 10.7-10.9% range for low and middle incomes. However, literature on economic returns to education in China is still sparse and shows much lower rates of returns compared with those from other countries, especially developing ones. An early study on this topic for China was made by Byron and Manaloto (1990) . Using a sample of eight hundred adult workers from the city of Nanjing in 1986, they estimate a low rate of returns between 1.2% and 3.7% for one additional year of schooling. Meng and Kidd (1997) also find a low rate of returns to education of 2.7% in 1987. Liu (1998) uses the China Household Income Project (CHIP) 1988 data and finds a slightly larger but still low rate of returns to education of 3.6% . Therefore, conclude that China is an outlier, in that its rapid economic growth is associated with returns to education remaining below the world average for comparable countries.
Low returns to education do not necessarily imply that education has no value in China. It may be because the value of education has not been properly reflected as private economic returns in labour markets. Fleisher and Wang (2004) find that the wages of educated workers are well below their marginal product in China, and the social returns to education will exceed the estimated private returns. Hence, the most widely accepted explanation of lower Chinese education returns may be the explanation of labour markets transition. Before 1978, wages of all workers were determined and controlled through a rigid system in China, designed to reduce labour costs during the rapid industrialization. Low wages were made possible by state-subsidized food prices and state provision of non-wage benefits to workers and their families. Throughout the economic reforms in China into the early 1990s, the wage differentials by levels of skill and schooling still remained narrow. After the "socialist market economy" was authorized in the early 1990s, the rigid wage system was gradually replaced by the flexible wage system. 1 Thus, the wage reform in China freed up the compressed wage differentials and thereafter had similar implications for the economic returns to education.
The explanation of labour markets transition is supported by the literature dealing with evidence of increasing returns to education over time, following the progress of economic reforms. Recent research suggests that reform and marketization are finally contributing to an increase in the relative wages of educated workers . Zhang et al. (2005) find a dramatic increase in education returns, from only 4.0% in 1988 to 10.2% in 2001 for one additional year of schooling. Most of the rise occurs after 1992 and supports the explanation of labour markets transition.
This paper provides alternative points of view on returns to education in China, using recent available China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) datasets from 1989 to 2009. We have three objectives. First, education has an important effect on wages but it is not clear whether this is because education raises productivity or because education is simply a signal of innate ability (Chevalier et al. 2004) . We need to test whether the returns to education in China reflect accumulation of human capital or are just signals of innate ability. Following Qiu and Hudson (2010) , we put the interaction of education and experience into regressions for all employees and for four age groups. We calculate the marginal effects of schooling at different percentiles of experience (Friedrich 1982 , Dreher and Gassebner 2007 , Potrafke 2009 ) and then graph their trends with ranges of standard errors. We find that Chinese data appear to strongly support the human capital explanation.
Second, most studies on education returns in China only apply the traditional OLS Mincerian model, which ignores the probable selection biases of employment. If the job assignments in the labour markets are not random, OLS estimation of education returns might be biased. The direction of biases is dependent on how jobs are assigned and how people make self-selections in the labour markets (Roy 1951 , Heckman 1974 , Heckman and Honoré 1990 . Appleton et al. (2005) observe a continued influence of political forces of loyalty, power, and patronage on the rewards for labour in the Chinese labour markets. Considering the selection bias of employment, we compare the estimates of education returns in a Heckman selection model with results from traditional OLS.
Last, but not least, the aggregated estimates of repeated cross-section regressions may be mix-ups of many heterogeneous cohorts and hence may suffer serious composition biases (Solon et al. 1994) . Li (2003) estimate education returns in the first and subsequent jobs, with workers grouped by the year of the first job, in order to observe the impact of the "Cultural Revolution". Their OLS estimators find that annual rates of education returns to the younger cohorts (whose first jobs were in 1984, 1987 and 1990) have received smaller returns to education than did the older cohorts (whose first jobs occurred prior to 1970 and 1975, and were affected by the Cultural Revolution). These cohort analyses reveal different views of education returns, compared to traditional aggregated analysis. Hence, we estimate wage equations for four age groups which can provide insights into the nature of labour markets changes and the fluctuations in returns to schooling over time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we outline the empirical specifications for our three objectives. In section 3 we describe our data and present descriptive statistics. Estimates of the returns to schooling are presented in section 4. Section 5 forms our conclusions.
Empirical specifications
Most previous literature relies on the theoretical foundations for returns to education, laid down by Schultz (1961) , Becker (1962) and Mincer (1974) . We also estimate a semi-logarithmic specification for the wages based on the Mincerian equation, given as:
where the dependent variable i w ln is the log form of real hourly wage rate of employee i. Wages consist of basic wages, subsidies and bonuses. We use the urban/rural consumer price indices, classified by year and province from the China Statistics Yearbooks, to deflate employees' labour incomes. In the independent variables S i is years of schooling; Exp i is an employee's potential labour markets experience, measured as age minus years of schooling minus six (Katz and Murph 1992) ; Urban i is a dummy variable for the urban areas; Gender i is a dummy variable capturing the wage differential between men and women; and Pr i is a set of province dummy variables.
Signal and human capital effects
There is debate whether the impact of education on earnings isolates the effects that are caused by education from the consequences of innate ability. Economists have relied on natural experiments, twins data, regression discontinuity, and field experiments to control for innate ability and estimate the causal impact of education (human capital) on earnings (see a review in Card (1999) Appleton et al. (2005) and Qiu and Hudson (2010) ). The individual's capital stock from experience can be treated as a factor of production in its own right and gradually depreciates with time. Hence, we can firstly assume (for simplicity) that the experience-augmented human capital is derived only from experience, and we also assume linearity and that it is possible to separate the three types of human capital, in equation (4). We cannot observe innate ability directly, hence we estimate wages as a function of education and experience as:
The total derivative of the wage function with respect to experience is as follows:
We calculate the partial derivative of wage function with respect to schooling, and allow the correlation between schooling and experience-augmented human capital. The equation (6) has the form:
For simplicity, we drop the individual subscript i. The first item is the quadratic experience items in equation (1) to proxy the isolated experience effect on the wage.
The second item is the combination of signal and human capital effects of schooling on the wage. The final item is the interaction of schooling and experience. If the only impact of schooling is to proxy innate ability, schooling cannot enhance human capital,
. Then, the above equation becomes:
The coefficients of schooling are only capturing the effects of variations of innate ability among individuals on wages. The impact of education on wages should be constant over time, as the coefficients of experience and education interaction are zero. Riley (1979) and Farber and Gibbons (1996) also argue that a basic condition for a signalling equilibrium is that employers' predictions based on education signals are correct on average. If not, then education and experience could enhance productivity, supporting the human capital theory.
Do the returns to schooling decline with rising experience since the individual left formal education? Normally, with rising experience, education will depreciate. Hence, the interaction between schooling and experience-augmented human capital should show a negative correlation (substitution relationship) 0 ) (
and make the coefficients of interaction items also negative because 0
. But, in a reforming society such as China, education chances may be very selective for innate ability (for example, very strict college entrance examinations) or political virtue (Broaded 1990) . Individual human capital, enhanced by education and experience, could be complementary if we consider the possibility that the innate ability or political virtue also enhances human capital from experience. Education-augmented human capital could be positively correlated with experience-augmented human capital. The marginal effects of schooling may increase with experience in this simultaneous system.
We use pooled data to test the trend of education returns with rising experience over time. Therefore, an interaction item is very important in our wage equation. After we add the interaction variable of schooling and experience, and allow year dummies Y for macro time dynamics, the empirical specification for our pooled data is as follows:
Heckman selection bias
One important issue to consider is the fact that wages are only observed for individuals actually working. Some individuals become inactive because they do not find a job, or their reservation wages are higher than offer wages. There would be a potential selection bias when estimating earnings equations. The Heckman selection model provides a solution through an additional selection equation (Heckman 1976) . People with more education might have higher participation rates, because they are more attractive to employers and their opportunity cost of unemployment are higher. Education increases expected wages over time, through higher wages when working (the effect captured through the Mincerian equation above) and through a higher probability of being employed (this effect will be captured through the Heckman selection model below).
As derived from equation (9), the hourly wage rate is a function of schooling, experience, urban, gender, province and year dummies, whereas the likelihood of employment is a function of marital status and (implicitly) the wage (via the inclusion of all above variables which determine the wage). The identifying variable for employment selection is the marital status of a respondent, that is, a dummy variable (0= single; 1=once married) which is widely used in literature (see an example for Italy, in Brown and Sessions (1999) ). Therefore, we assume that wage is observed if 
The inverse Mills ratio (lambda) defined as in (Heckman 1979 ) is designed to correct for selectivity bias in the samples. A significant coefficient on the lambda term indicates non-random selection into employment in the relevant sample.
Age groups
To gain more understanding of patterns of returns to schooling in China, we estimate the regressions with separated age group samples. The four age groups are people born before 1950, during 1950-1961, during 1962-1980 and in 1981 or after. The cut-off time choice of groups is based on the widely accepted structural break points in Chinese modern history to allow heterogeneity of groups in our study. The first structural break point is the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and then two structural break points based on the two baby boom periods (1950-1961 and 1962-1980) . The special age group born 1950-1961 mainly received their education during the "Cultural Revolution" period (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) , when the leftist ideological goals of an egalitarian educational agenda reached a peak and the normal education process was interrupted and replaced by continuous political movements (Qian and Smyth 2008) .
They find this group has considerably lower returns to education than younger people who received standardised education and entered the labour market during the urban economic reform era.
( Figure 1 around here)
Data description
The data used in this paper are eight waves (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009) of the CHNS dataset, which has been collected by the Carolina Population
Centre and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety. The CHNS data cover two decades of Chinese economic reform since 1989, and contain accurate information on wages, education, and other demographic information which provides a basis for an estimate of the returns to education. Eight provinces are covered by data in the period of 1989-1997 and nine provinces thereafter. 3 We exclude individuals working as farmers, fishermen and hunters in the primary sector (mainly agriculture). Employees with a salary (wage earners) between 16 and 65 years old are our basic sample. 4 The full sample composed of employees, unemployed persons and self-employees is also analyzed for the Heckman correction. Table 1 represents the data description for the employee and full samples. Table 3 presents results of repeated cross-section OLS, as in equation (1). We find, in common with others that education returns for one additional year generally increase from 2.6% in 1989 to 7.9% in 2009. Results by groups are very similar to the aggregated results in 1989, and this is consistent with the highly regulated wage setting in the 1980s. With the ownership reform in the 1980s, the role of state-owned enterprises has been weakened in the Chinese economy and has triggered the transformation from a planned labour allocation system into a well-functioning labour markets (Appleton et al. 2005) . China authorized the "socialist market economy" to accelerate reforms, including to the labour markets, the effect of which led to a major reduction in rates of returns for the aggregated sample or groups in the early 1990s.
Empirical results
Camposa and Jolliffe's (2003) study of Hungary, as well as that of Flabbi et al. (2008) in examining eight transition economies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) argue that the skills acquired cannot be easily transferred to a changed economic situation. Thus one would expect to see a temporary decline to returns during any period of transition. (Liu et al. 2010) . This loss can only be partly offset by the rising employment proportions of the younger groups with still significant and high education returns. Table 4 shows the estimates from OLS regressions using the pooled dataset for all eight waves. In order to test whether schooling only reflects the signal effects of innate ability the interaction of schooling and experience has been regarded as an explanatory variable, as in equation (9). For all employees, the coefficient of schooling is 6% for one additional year. The highest coefficients are for groups born before 1950 and in 1981 or after (around 10%), but they are below 5% for the other two middle-aged groups, suggesting lower rates of returns to schooling acquired during the Mao era. The difference between Table 4 and Table 3 is derived from the interaction item of schooling and experience. The coefficients of schooling in Table 4 are actually the education returns when the labour market experience is equal to zero (Friedrich 1982 Next, we will use the Heckman selection model to correct selection biases. We apply the Heckman selection model to provide consistent, asymptotically efficient estimates for schooling. Table 5 presents the results of the Heckman selection model using equation (9) and (10). The selectivity effect (lambda) is significant for the full sample and the four groups. LR/Wald tests of independent equations (rho = 0) are easily rejected for all ML specifications. These tests clearly justify the Heckman selection model with data. By correcting the selection bias, the education returns for the full sample decrease from 6% to 5.2% for one addition year, and decrease from 9.1% to 7.4%
for the group born before 1950. Returns do not change very much for the group born 1950-1961, while the two younger groups have higher rates (from 4.1% to 11.8% for the group 1962-1980; and from 9.3% to 22.1% for the group born in 1981 or after) than in the OLS specification. Although these results are only point estimates, as experience is equal to 0, we still find that they are closer to the results in other transition countries (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004, Flabbi et al. 2008) . The only insignificant coefficient remains that to be found in the group born 1950-1961, the schooling years of which may only reflect the innate ability as we find in the OLS regressions. This is not very surprising, because the group born 1950-1961 mainly received their education during the "Cultural Revolution" period (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) , when education chances were only allocated for selected students based on political virtue. Those from families of workers, peasants or soldiers were deemed the most "virtuous" and were among the first admitted. This has generated the label of workerpeasant-soldier student (gong-nong-bing xueyuan) for those students entering college during the early 1970s. Identification as a Cultural Revolution-era university student continues to carry a negative loading and, in general, depressed opportunities for advancement (Broaded 1990, Fleisher and .
For the only-child-policy group, even though the starting education for one additional year are as high as about 20% , the most rapidly depreciation of education offsets the high coefficients of schooling as a new entrant. However, since we have only a few hundred observations in the youngest group, any formal interpretation should be concerned with caveats and needs further research. Therefore, the human capital explanation of education is supported by our study, except for the group educated during the "Cultural Revolution". (Table 5 around 
Conclusions
Schooling itself can be identified as an augmenting factor of human capital, or merely as signals reflecting innate ability. Moreover, traditional aggregated Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates are biased by selection problem and mix-ups of group heterogeneity. Hence, in this paper, we use the eight waves of the CHNS dataset to estimate the rates of private returns to schooling in China over the last two decades. We categorize data into four age groups according to the structural breaks of the birth rates and estimate the marginal effects of schooling with increasing experience, using OLS and the Heckman selection model.
The OLS estimates of education returns for all employees are 2.6% for one addition year in 1989, then declining to around 1.5% in 1991 and 1993, possibly due to the political campaigns and delayed reaction for labour market reforms. And then, education returns increase to 9.4% for one addition year in 2004 before finally dropping to 7.9% for one addition year in 2009 with the dramatic loss of human capital of the retired group (born before 1950). Groups have similar education returns in the early years of the 1990s, but they experience heterogeneous dynamics later. This suggests a substantial influence of institutional reforms in the labour markets. Our age group analyses support the labour market transition explanation of the evolution of returns to schooling over time.
The interactive variable of schooling and experience is used in the Heckman model to test whether years of schooling only reflect the signal effects of innate ability.
We find that the education returns for one additional year decline with labour markets experience, which supports the human capital hypothesis for all groups except the group born 1950-1961, the schooling years of which may only reflect the innate ability or political virtue as we find in the OLS regressions. This conclusion is not very surprising because the group born 1950-1961 mainly received their education during the "Cultural Revolution" period (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) when education chances were only allocated for selected students based on political virtue. This group also has the lowest education returns after we correct selection biases, just as found by . 1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 Birth rate ( 
